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Introduction
On 11 March 2011, Japan was struck by a magnitude 9.0 
earthquake, the fourth largest earthquake in the world 
since 1900 (the Great East Japan earthquake). Th  e  earth-
quake was immediately followed by a tsunami, which at 
its highest was estimated to be 37.9 meters. In addition, 
accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
caused radiation injuries to power plant workers. Th  e 
number of those killed or missing is reported to be 
greater than 23,000, and is expected to increase. In this 
commentary, we report four key observations, focusing 
on the diﬀ  erences from the Great Hanshin earthquake of 
1995, another major devastating earthquake to strike 
Japan.
Disaster preparations in Japan
In 1995, Kobe City was struck by a magnitude 7.3 earth-
quake (the Great Hanshin earthquake). Approximately 
6,425 people were killed and 43,772 were injured. Many 
victims were trapped under collapsed buildings and 
suﬀ  ered from crush injuries [1]. Th   e inability to provide 
hemodialysis for the unpredictably high number of 
victims contributed to additional deaths. Th   e Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare reported that 500 deaths 
could have been prevented if regular healthcare services, 
as delivered under normal circumstances, had been 
promptly provided.
In an eﬀ  ort to learn from this experience, in 2005, the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare organized medical 
teams specializing in disaster medicine, called Disaster 
Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) [2]. Th   ese teams are 
deployed during the acute phase of a disaster, particularly 
within the ﬁ  rst 48 hours, not only for natural disasters, 
but also for disasters such as airplane or train crashes. As 
of 2010, a total of 703 such teams comprising more than 
4,300 medical professionals have been registered. Pre-
fectural governors can activate DMATs depending on the 
magnitude of the disaster. For example, all DMATs from 
the entire nation would be activated if a large earthquake 
were to strike the Tokyo metropolitan area.
Immediately after the earthquake of 11 March 2011, 
DMATs throughout the nation were activated. Within 
the ﬁ  rst 24 hours, more than 300 teams had initiated 
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Tohoku area, northeastern Japan. In addition to the 
DMATs, the Japanese Medical Association, the Japanese 
Red Cross, and many other organizations voluntarily sent 
medical teams to aﬀ  ected areas.
The spectrum of injuries and drowning death
Th  e predominance of death by drowning in the Great 
East Japan earthquake is a clear distinction from the 
Great Hanshin earthquake, in which hundreds of victims 
were killed by trauma. Th  e National Police Agency 
reported that 92.5% of fatalities were caused by drowning 
while hospitals were crowded with hundreds of survivors 
suﬀ  ering from mild to moderate injuries. According to a 
DMAT operating at Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital (402 
beds), 4,891 patients presented at the hospital in the ﬁ  rst 
11 days. Th   e distribution of patients according to triage 
color was 63.1% (green, ambulatory), 27.1% (yellow, 
serious injury), 7.7% (red, life-threatening conditions) 
and 2.0% (black, death). Th  e most common conditions 
were pneumonia from aspiration of seawater or cellulitis 
from wounds, and such victims were not critically ill 
enough to require ICU admission. Dozens of patients 
with red tags were transferred by helicopter to Sendai, 
the nearest metropolitan area.
Learning from lessons of the Great Hanshin earth-
quake, several DMATs were assigned to airports in 
anticipation of transporting patients who required urgent 
hemodialysis to non-aﬀ   ected areas; however, most of 
these DMATs were not required because of the absence 
of major trauma patients.
Use of internet technology
In the 2011 earthquake, advances in internet technology 
enabled clinicians to promptly identify the needs of the 
aﬀ   ected area, which made a noticeable diﬀ  erence  to 
disaster response compared with the Great Hanshin 
earthquake of 1995. Cell-phone signal and internet access 
were regained by the next day in some areas and by three 
days in most areas. Using email lists or social network 
services, such as Twitter, aﬀ  ected hospitals and individual 
physicians provided timely reports of their medical 
resource status - for example, that ‘water, food, medication, 
and dialysate will run out by tomorrow’.
Th   ese mutual communications on the internet enabled 
professional societies to promptly assess what resources 
Figure 1. Hospitals with ICU availability are represented by green (adult) and by yellow (pediatrics) pins, using Google Map technology. 
The red star indicates the epicenter of the magnitude 9.0 earthquake. (Accessed 15 May 2011 at [4].)
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facilities patients were to be transferred to. For instance, 
the Japanese Society of Intensive Care Medicine (JSICM) 
opened a dialogue via a newly established email list to 
discuss the medical needs. Th   ey anticipated that patient 
transfers would be required on a large scale given the 
magnitude of the disaster. Information on ICU bed 
availability, hemodialysis capacity, and reserved 
mechanical ventilators were collected and became open 
to the public within the ﬁ  rst 48 hours of the earthquake 
on their website using Google Map technology (Figure 1).
Disrupted primary care and the vulnerable 
population
Similar to the Great Hanshin earthquake, the disaster of 
2011 endangered vulnerable elderly people because of 
the disruption to pre-existing primary care, which led to 
a change in the spectrum of disease after the ﬁ  rst 72 
hours [3]. At least 282 people died from deteriorating 
pre-existing chronic medical conditions in the ﬁ  rst  2 
weeks, even though they were able to be evacuated from 
the tsunami.
Many victims were barely able to evacuate from the 
tsunami, and neither could they bring their belongings. 
People visited hospitals requesting medication for 
chronic conditions, some of which were scarce, such as 
immunosuppressive therapies. In addition, hospitals 
were isolated from their regular supply networks. 
Th  erefore, these vulnerable people had to wait for a 
weeks knowing that their chronic medical conditions 
would deteriorate.
Th   e shortage of dialysate, water, and electricity created 
a dangerous situation for hemodialysis-dependent 
patients. Some dialysate manufacturers in Ibaraki 
Prefecture, on the Paciﬁ  c coast, immediately announced 
total non-operational status. Patients with hemodialysis 
needs voluntarily left the stricken area and reestablished 
a care routine at new locations, anticipating a long 
evacuation life.
Conclusion
We report here observations by Japanese physicians from 
the ﬁ  rst month after the 2011 earthquake. Although this 
catastrophe has caused the most devastating damage to 
Japan since World War II, we believe that our systematic 
preparation for disasters somewhat alleviated the 
damage. Japan is recovering and shall recover fully from 
this tragedy.
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